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ABSTRACT 
We present an endogenous growth model that is based upon the interaction between human and 
cultural capital. We argue that the available endogenous growth models fail to take into account the 
full set of relevant factors that make endogenous growth possible, and that the missing entry is in fact 
cultural capital, through its effect on total factor productivity. We show that, within the context of the 
model, cultural investment has a positive impact on the growth rate and on income provided that the 
economy is sufficiently culture-intensive, and that this effect is further magnified the more total factor 
productivity is sensitive to the stock of cultural capital.  
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1. Introduction 
Since recently, the word “culture” was hard to find in the economic literature. In the rare 
positive occurrences, the interest toward culture as a purposeful productive activity (e.g. art, 
theatre, cinema, music, literature and so on) was practically almost absent, with notable though 
pretty isolated exceptions (e.g. the seminal and early contribution of Baumol and Bowen, 1966). 
More recently, interest in “cultural” themes has been rising, but however, once again, sticking to 
a very broad and generic idea of culture, that is being identified, in turn, with such diverse fields 
as  “religion”, “trust”, or even “institutions”.1 This research trend reflects a sensitivity for the role 
of ‘contextual’ characteristics such as customs and religions, ethnicity, geography, genetic 
endowments in determining economic outcomes, and it is somewhat natural to group such a 
heterogeneous bunch of factors under the all-encompassing label of ‘culture’. And indeed, one 
can find authoritative examples of highly influential analyses of how these kinds of ‘cultural’ 
factors have shaped up, and continue to shape, the social fabric of market capitalism (one for all, 
the notorious Weberian thesis on the role of the protestant ethic in the development of modern 
capitalism). Economically focused approaches of this kind abound, and cover many different 
issues of great interest (among others, Barro and McClearly, 2003; Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 
2006; Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2009; Tabellini, 2010). But in all these examples, ‘culture’ is 
really little more than a shorthand for ‘contextual social factors’: Little attention, if any, is paid to 
less than generic meanings (or interpretations) of the term. 
One can therefore wonder whether reference to culture in this very ample sense is ultimately 
appropriate rather than misleading, especially provided that, not only a small but growing group 
of theorists, but also policy makers at the national and local level, are indeed paying increasing 
attention to cultural activities in the strict sense: Visual and performing arts, heritage, or the 
cultural and creative industries (Towse, 2003). A number of studies have been carried out to 
demonstrate the potential of creative productions in terms of turnover, employment, and birth of 
new firms (e.g. KEA, 2006), and at the city planning level the new ‘cultural wave’ has become so 
pervasive that it is now almost commonsense to reason in terms of the ‘cultural economy of 
cities’ (Amin and Thrift, 2007). Accordingly, it has become customary to use the term “cultural 
economics” to indicate the subject that was previously acknowledged as the economics of the 
arts, since “the arts” stand for a more specific and narrow subject that the one spanned by cultural 
economics. The role of culture is becoming essential in the understanding of post-industrial 
development, and is likely to be even more so in the future to come. 
                                                
1 See Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2006) for an historical perspective on the debate on economics and culture. 
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On this basis, it is important to get a much better grasp of how these mechanisms actually 
work in building up value. Also, as the recent experiences of creative city development seem to 
suggest that culture might function as an auto-catalytic engine of growth, it becomes important to 
figure out whether, and to what extent, culture plays a complementary role with respect to 
education in the mechanics of endogenous growth models such as the ones put forward by the 
New Growth Theory, which are traditionally based on human capital investment (e.g. Aghion 
and Howitt, 1997). We feel that traditional endogenous growth models, by focusing exclusively 
on the educational side of the knowledge economy, might be missing something essential to 
capture the critical conditions that ultimately allow a local or national economy to experiment 
sustained growth driven by intangible assets accumulation. Our contention is that cultural 
production, and its socio-economic implications on a variety of non-market mediated aspects 
such as the informational and motivational spillovers on innovation, social and environmental 
sustainability, or the construction of a local identity that encourages foreign direct investment, 
may be an essential part of the picture upon which it is still necessary to shed some light. And 
even more so, the complementarities between educational and cultural assets are to be brought 
well under the spotlight: If on the one hand acquiring skills is important, it is equally important to 
be able to make a creative use of such skills – and there is room to believe that for this to be the 
case, living in a culturally stimulating environment may make a substantial difference. Thus, in a 
nutshell, we need to construct endogenous growth models where human and cultural capital are 
both concurrently accumulated, and optimised with respect to their strategic complementarity: A 
challenging task, but one that might be conducive to a new way of looking at culture as a key 
policy variable and not only as a nice and commendable way to spend one’s free, leisure time.  
The structure of the remainder of the paper is the following. Section 2 provides a discussion of 
why and how culture generates economic value, and introduces the notion of cultural capital. 
Section 3 analyzes how culture may be at the root of a specific engine of endogenous economic 
growth, and its possible relationship with more traditional endogenous growth engines such as 
education. Section 4 introduces the model and delivers the paper’s results. Section 5 provides a 
final discussion of the results and briefly sketches some directions for future work.  
 
2. How does cultural production matter in the economy? 
The traditional economic view on cultural production refers to a pre-industrial conception of 
culture as a luxury good, accessible only by the wealthy, and mainly provided for by the State or 
by the politically and economically powerful to enhance their public image and social reputation 
– that is to say, a vision based upon public or private patronage. In such contexts, there was of 
 3 
 
course a recognition of the positive effects of culture in terms of the circulation of ideas, of social 
and civil progress, of expression of fundamental human values, and so on, and for this reason it 
was felt that culture could be considered a merit good, deserving to be supported through public 
transfers. The debate was thus concentrating on whether or not culture should receive public 
money, and to what extent, but it was practically outside of question that culture could be 
considered a major source of economic value, and not simply one of the many ways to spend 
money – and this may explain why economists devoted so little attention to the issue for such a 
long time. A natural consequence of this view is that, however deserving, culture is a superfluous 
activity, i.e. something that the economy can afford mainly in phases of sustained economic 
growth. During slumps, on the contrary, cultural budgets are bound to be among the first to be 
cut, in that money spent on culture is not commonly thought to have a strong anti-cyclic impact 
on the level of economic activity. 
But although in many social and economic environments this outdated idea of the social role 
of culture is still alive, scholars researching in cultural economics have been able to demonstrate 
how culture can indeed provide an important contribution to the generation of economic value – 
and the clearest illustration of the point is the increasing weight of the cultural and creative sector 
in national GDPs: Just to make an example, in spite of the substantial measurement problems that 
still affect the statistics of cultural sectors (van der Pol, 2007) – a fact that may have led to a 
systematic underestimation of the actual economic potential of cultural production (e.g. 
Markusen et al., 2008) – the already cited KEA report for EU estimated, as of 2005, a turnover 
for the cultural and creative sector at twice the order of magnitude of that of the automobile 
sector (KEA, 2006). To this ‘direct’ effect, moreover, one has to add the already cited spillover 
effects on dimensions like innovation (Bakshi and Throsby, 2009) or sustainability (Wang, 2010) 
– something that can be difficult to compute with precision, but that is likely to have a far from 
negligible macroeconomic effect (KEA, 2009). Moreover, in terms of employment, the labor-
intensive cultural and creative industries are giving a significant contribution to the maintenance 
of the level of employment. In particular, it seems that occupation in such industries tends to be 
more stable across the economic cycle than in other, more capital intensive sectors (KEA, 2006), 
although much seems to depend on the actual definition of cultural industries that is adopted 
(Throsby and Zednik, 2007).  
Following Cunningham et al. (2008), we can consider four models of the possible relationship 
between the cultural and the economic dimension. They can be labelled as follows: (1) the 
welfare model, (2) the competitive model, (3) the growth model, and (4) the innovation model. 
Traditionally, as already emphasized, the study of the cultural economy has been dominated by 
the welfare model, based on a market failure argument which claims that it is in general 
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impossible for a private firm to earn enough from cultural activities to cover costs, let alone to 
make profits. The only exception are the cultural industries, characterized by large and industrial-
scale production, often controlled or directly managed by multinational enterprises. In this 
situation, the reasoning goes on to say, a market for cultural value exists, and the behaviour of 
profit maximizing firms would be similar to that of any other profit maximizing firm (the 
competitive model then applies to the movies, music and broadcasting sectors, and to some part 
of the publishing and print sector). Models (3) and (4) introduce in the analysis the role of 
creative industries, giving particular emphasis to the impact that they may have on the general 
level of economic activity. In the growth model, the turnover dynamics of creative industries is 
regarded as an important growth driver, because of the numerous spillovers which originate from 
the creative sectors into other productive sectors, such as from games to simulation and virtual 
reality training in aerospace, from cutting-edge design to quality manufacturing, and so on. More 
generally, the innovation model suggests that the economic value of the creative industries stems 
from their contribution to the production of new ideas or technologies, independently of whether 
cultural industries are a proper industrial sector or not, in that, irrespectively of this, they provide 
a stream of symbols and meanings that stimulates innovation and technological progress.  
This paper examines the role of culture in a perspective that combines the growth and the 
innovation models. Specifically, we use the notion of cultural capital within the context of 
endogenous growth theory, where the accumulation of human capital is usually considered a 
primary driver of growth. In our view, what counts for economic growth is the creative use of 
human capital that is made possible by the presence of a relevant stock of cultural capital. 
Behind this statement there is the idea that creativity can only flourish in contexts where large 
sectors of the economy and of society take advantage of the mind-opening stimuli and attitudes 
brought about by the availability of rich cultural assets. 
In order to capture the idea of cultural assets, we refer to the notion of cultural capital, which, 
following Throsby (2001), is defined as the stock of tangible and intangible cultural expressions. 
According to this view, the stock of tangible cultural capital consists of all kinds of buildings, 
structures, sites and locations endowed with cultural significance (heritage), and of artworks and 
artefacts existing as private goods such as paintings, sculptures, and other objects (see Figure 1). 
Intangible cultural capital, instead, comprises both artistic performances and celebrations (see 
section B of Figure 1) as well as ideas, practices, beliefs, traditions and values that derive from 
the six main cultural domains depicted in Figure 1, together with the stock of artworks existing in 
the public domain as public goods, such as certain instances of literature and music.  
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FIGURE 1. A definition of cultural domains for cultural capital 
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Figure 2.  Framework for cultural statistics domains  
RELATED DOMAINS
A. CULTURAL 
and  NATURAL 
HERITAGE 
- Museums (also 
virtual)
- Archeological and 
Historical Places  
- Cultural 
Landscapes
- Natural Heritage
B. 
PERFORMANCE 
and 
CELEBRATION
- Performing Arts
- Music
- Festivals, Fairs 
and Feasts
C. VISUAL ARTS 
and CRAFTS 
- Fine Arts  
- Photography
- Crafts 
D. BOOKS and 
PRESS
- Books
- Newspaper and 
Magazine
- Other printed 
matter 
- Library (also 
virtual) 
- Book Fairs
E. AUDIO-VISUAL 
and 
INTERACTIVE 
MEDIA
- Film and Video 
- TV and Radio 
(also Internet live 
streaming)
- Internet 
podcasting
- Video Games 
(also Online) 
CULTURAL DOMAINS
F. DESIGN and 
CREATIVE 
SERVICES
- Fashion Design
- Graphic Design
- Interior Design
- Landscape 
Design
- Architectural 
Services
- Advertising 
Services
INTANGIBLE CULTURAL HERITAGE 
(oral traditions and expressions, rituals, languages, social practices) 
EDUCATION and TRAINING
ARCHIVING and PRESERVING
G. TOURISM
 - Charter travel 
and tourist 
services
- Hospitality and 
accommodation
H. SPORTS and 
RECREATION
- Sports  
- Physical fitness 
and well being
- Amusement 
and Theme 
Parks
- Gambling
EQUIPMENT and SUPPORTING MATERIALS
INTANGIBLE CULTURAL 
HERITAGE 
EDUCATION and TRAINING
ARCHIVING and PRESERVING
EQUIPMENT and SUPPORTING 
MATERIALS  
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Unesco (2009) 
 
Delimiting the field of cultural production is far from easy. There is for instance a current of 
thought that basically identifies culture with highbrow productions, whereas others (and this is by 
now the reference position) not only include all forms of high-, medium- or lowbrow production, 
but claim that such a classification is itself practically devoid of meaning in the contemporary 
context of cultural production practices, characterized by massive crossover of contents, genres, 
and media. Also, the spectrum of fields that fall within the cultural realm is constantly 
expanding, ranging from traditional ones such as arts, heritage, museums, theatre and live 
performance, to the cultural industries, and even to the creative industries and the new online 
digital content platforms.  
The issue is further complicated by the often complex mingling of material and intangible 
aspects in the definition of what a cultural production is – a good, a service, an experience, a 
nexus of meaning, and so on. And in fact, even outside the cultural realm in its proper sense 
(however broad), there is an increasing tendency that causes consumer (and sometimes even 
intermediate) goods and services to incorporate an intangible added value deriving from design, 
aesthetics, symbolic and identity values (e.g. Verganti, 2009), whereas, at the same time, an 
increasing fraction of the economic system consists of the production and circulation of 
information goods (Shapiro and Varian, 1999). 
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If we want to appreciate how culture fits into the general picture of growth determinants, we 
thus have to understand how this heterogeneous complex of objects and meanings may become a 
main ingredient of a successful factor mix in the current, highly competitive and transient global 
scenario. 
 
3. What counts for growth is the creative use of the educational capital 
State-of-the-art analyses of economic growth tend to identify the accumulation of human 
capital as one of the main growth drivers. However, despite a practically unanimous theoretical 
support, empirical evidence that increases in educational attainments matter for growth is 
unexpectedly not so clear-cut.2 There are many different attempts at explanation of this puzzle, 
mainly based on data or estimation techniques arguments.3 All of them, however, take for 
granted that the right proxy to measure human capital is the so-called “educational capital” (i.e 
the number of years of schooling), but we claim that this is not the case, since economic growth 
depends not only on the level of formal education but also on the level of cultural capital existing 
in a society. An important role is played by the complementarity between cultural capital and 
educational capital accumulation. 
Educational career and attainments are certainly useful on the labor market as a signal of one’s 
acquired abilities, and most likely they also give information about the personal endowment of 
knowledge and skills assets, but certainly they are not a crucial test as to the actual potential for 
successful professional or entrepreneurial accomplishment, as clearly exemplified by the 
biographies of many successful tycoons or businessmen. Likewise, Scott (2000) argues that the 
presence of skilled workers is not a sufficient condition for successful and continued economic 
development of a regional system, as what matters indeed is vast social salience of qualities such 
as cultural insight, imagination, and originality. Creative people react more promptly to any 
change. Creativity stimulates Schumpeterian entrepreneurs in establishing new firms, but it also 
makes labor-force more productive, both in young, dynamic start-ups and in established, mature 
companies. Highly educated and creative people have higher incomes and participate more in 
                                                
2 Empirical results on this topic still remain largely controversial depending on: 1) the methodological approach being used, 
whether cross-country growth accounting (Benhabib and Spiegel, 1994; Krueger and Lindahl, 2001; Pritchett, 2001 and Caselli, 
2005, among others) or cross-country growth regressions (Barro, 1999; Easterly and Levine, 1997; Islam, 1995); 2) the measure 
of human capital employed. Wößmann (2003) provides a detailed survey of all the main measures of human capital used to date 
by empirical studies on growth (in particular adult literacy rates, school enrollment ratios and average years of schooling of the 
working-age population), and analyzes the pros and cons of each of them; 3) the type of data employed. Studies using cross-
section data, unlike those based on panel data, generally find that human capital accumulation has a positive effect on the rate of 
growth of real per-capita income. Islam (1995) summarizes this finding by observing that: “…whenever researchers have 
attempted to incorporate the temporal dimension of human capital variables into growth regressions, outcomes of either 
statistical insignificance or negative sign have surfaced”. See also Topel (1999) and Mathur (1999) for reviews.  
3 See, among others, Temple (1999; 2001), Benhabib and Spiegel (2005), Bassanini and Scarpetta (2001). 
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community activities and have a higher marginal propensity to consume local services, thus 
sustaining the local economy more effectively. A positive externality effect can also be 
envisaged, as human capital may be more productive where more creative people are working 
and living together – and this concentration effect is at the root of some of the most successful 
explanations given in the past few years as to the competitive potential of cities (Glaeser et al., 
1992, Glaeser and Resseger, 2010). Florida (2002, 2005) introduces the idea that economic 
growth is facilitated by the presence of the creative class, that is composed of creative and 
innovative - and therefore highly productive – workers; and although his model has been 
severely criticized (e.g. Peck, 2005) and even refuted on a statistical basis (e.g. Hoyman and 
Faricy, 2009), the main tenet of the effect of density on city growth seems to stand even if the 
general framework doesn’t (e.g. Knudsen et al., 2008). When competition cannot take place 
through costs cutting, product innovation represents the distinctive successful factor for the 
economic system of either a region or a country (e.g. Porter, 2003), and therefore the spillover 
effect brought about by a socially salient creative attitude becomes all the more relevant in 
explaining growth success – and possibly failure. 
The positive effects of creativity are greater and deeper when the cultural dimension plays a 
relevant role in the economic system according to what briefly discussed in Section 2. This 
pattern of development benefits from the widening of the borders of cultural and creative 
industries as productive sectors.4 Not incidentally, several of the most recent examples of 
successful global companies have to do with the creation of socially networked platforms for 
creative content. The increased cultural orientation brought about by the expansion of size and 
scope of the creative industries stimulates the production of new ideas and new technologies, so 
that we can properly reason in terms of culturally and creatively generated spill-over effects that 
contaminate other productive sectors to an increasing extent, both in industrialized and emerging 
countries, as the latter are getting into the new global creativity game at earlier and earlier stages 
of their development trajectory. As the UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity 
states, “as source of exchange, innovation and creativity, cultural diversity is as necessary for 
humankind as biodiversity is for nature” – and probably it is equally necessary in terms of 
successful environmental adaptation, where of course the ‘environment’ of cultural diversity is 
the current social and economic global scenario. 
 
 
                                                
4 In the literature, no clear agreement exists as to which industries should or should not be included in the cultural sector of the 
economy, and defining the cultural or creative industries is a matter of some debate (Throsby, 2008).  
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4.  An endogenous growth model for cultural capital 
As highlighted by Sacco and Segre (2009), despite the growing literature aimed at explaining 
how cultural and artistic production actually feeds long-term economic growth, it is generally the 
case that in such analyses all important factors are grouped together, so that the causal 
relationships and interplays between them are not investigated in depth. In the attempt of filling 
this gap, the present paper examines the role of cultural capital in fostering economic growth 
within the framework traced by the New Growth Theory, and according to the lines set up in the 
previous discussion. At this regard – building upon Bucci and Segre (2011) – we present a 
theoretical model that describes how economic growth can be driven by the combination of the 
investments in human and cultural capital. Investments in human capital usually refer to the sole 
educational capital and are therefore measured in terms of the number of years of schooling; 
investments in cultural capital refer to the stock of a composite mix of assets corresponding to 
the six cultural domains presented in Figure 1 above. In the model we postulate that the growth 
of human capital is itself induced by the growth of cultural capital (in a sense that will be made 
more apparent in a moment).5 
In more detail, consider a closed economy in which final output (GDP), Y , is used as the 
numeraire good ( 1YP = ) and employed in part for consumption purposes and in part for 
investment in cultural capital. The hypothesis that the economy is closed comes from the fact that 
cultural expression originates and grows in a particular place. Culture is of course universal and 
global, but at the same time it is very “local”, since every cultural expression is based on the 
“genius loci” characterising a particular place. In each of the the six cultural domains displayed 
in Figure 1, the idiosyncratic dimension of culture can be envisaged. This is clear in the case of 
cultural and natural heritage (domain A), that are physically located in a precise place and are 
typically not internationally mobile (such as are museums, monuments, archeological and 
historical sites, cultural landscapes, etc.), but it also applies to the others domains and especially 
to their intangible dimension. Toursim - and in particular cultural tourism - is the main result of 
this. Due to the different cultural atmosphere, any good or service is unique when produced and 
consumed in a particular place.6  
Production of final output takes place competitively (the sector producing the homogeneous 
good Y  is populated by a very large number of small, price-taking, atomistic, and structurally-
                                                
5 Unlike the paper by Ottaviano and Peri (2005) - where culture is intended as a private good relevant to households 
consumption - following the literature briefly illustrated in section 2 and 3, our model treats culture as an input in 
production, so emphasizing the importance of cultural capital as a factor-input in production activities.  
6 Most of the cultural products and services have at the same time also a universal value and therefore a global 
international market. This aspect is, however, behind the scope of the present paper. 
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identical firms). Hence, we can focus on the behaviour of a single representative firm employing 
the following Cobb-Douglas technology: 
 
        1t t tY A H
α α−=Ω ,    0Ω > ,    ( )0;1α∈ .           (1) 
In Eq. (1) tH  and tA  are, respectively, the aggregate stocks of human and cultural capital 
available in the economy at time t. 0Ω >  is a technological parameter representing the (constant) 
aggregate TFP (Total Factor Productivity). With cultural capital viewed as the stock of tangible 
and intangible cultural expressions (Throsby, 2001) and, therefore, having a productive use per 
se (Throsby, 2008), we can think of the total stock of human capital (H ) as the number of 
workers, L , times the average level of quality (namely, the number of years of schooling) of each 
worker, h . We postulate that each individual in the population works and supplies inelastically 
one unit of labor-services per unit of time.7 Hence, population size coincides with the number of 
workers (the labor-force). Because we are not interested in modelling population dynamics and 
its effects on long-run growth, we assume that L  is constant and, for the sake of simplicity, 
normalize this variable to one ( 0 1,  0tL L t= ≡ ∀ ≥ ). Under these assumptions, we clearly have 
t tH h= . The specification of the aggregate production function (Eq. 1) implies that it has constant 
returns to scale to A  and H  taken together. In the same equation, α  and ( )1 α−  denote 
respectively, for given Ω , the human and cultural capital shares in aggregate GDP. 
Because the representative firm producing consumption goods is small enough with respect to 
the size of the whole economy, it takes tA  and tH  as given. Moreover, we postulate that TFP 
depends on some function of the “relative intensity” of cultural capital at the economy-wide 
level (the ratio of the aggregate cultural to human capital stocks, /t tA HΔ ≡ ) and assume that the 
function linking aggregate TFP (Ω ) to this ratio (Δ ) takes the form: 
t
t
A
H
η
η⎛ ⎞Ω ≡ ≡ Δ⎜ ⎟
⎝ ⎠
,     0η ≠ .             (1’) 
Since each single firm takes tA  and tH  as given, it also takes TFP (Ω ) as given. The ratio 
/t tA HΔ ≡  can be interpreted as a measure of the economy’s average cultural capital (cultural 
capital per unit of human capital). This ratio reflects the importance that a balanced combination 
of arts exposures and formal education would be present in the economic system. As recalled in 
                                                
7 This amounts to assuming that there is no endogenous choice between work and leisure time at the individual level. 
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Sacco and Segre (2009), throughout the history, science, math and technology have flourished 
only where and when all the arts have flourished, and nearly all of the most important great 
inventors were also musicians, artists, writers or poets. It has also been demonstrated that 
exposure to and participation in the arts strengthens children’s educational performance. With Ω  
constant and taken as given, and 0η ≠  human and cultural capital need to grow at the same rate, 
a rate which will be endogenous and time-invariant along the balanced growth path (BGP, 
henceforth) equilibrium. In a moment we shall give a more formal definition of this model’s 
BGP equilibrium.8 Given Ω , we observe that the stock of human capital, tH , equals: 
 
1/
t t
t
A AH η= =Δ Ω
. 
 
Therefore, as already mentioned, in this model the growth of H  is itself induced by the 
accumulation of cultural capital. In order to have the most general possible model, at the moment 
we do not impose any further constraint on the parameter η , except that it is to be different from 
zero.9 This parameter (η ), measuring the sign and the magnitude of the effect (an externality-
effect) of a change in the economy’s average cultural capital on aggregate TFP,10 is going to 
play a relevant role in the model. 
                                                
8 The constancy of Ω  is indeed explained by the constancy of the ratio /A H . In turn, the constancy of this ratio arises from the 
fact that another way (alternative to the traditional formal schooling and training-on-the-job arguments) for a country to increase 
its own available stock of human capital is to increase its own stock of cultural capital (in other words, investment in a country’s 
cultural capital can itself contribute to rise the aggregate amount of human capital of its inhabitants). Since in this paper we are 
interested in emphasizing the role of cultural capital as engine of endogenous growth, we make the extreme hypothesis that there 
exists a one-to-one relationship between the growth rate of A  and the growth rate of H  (this is the implicit assumption behind 
postulating the constancy of /A H ). Using a two-sector growth framework, in a companion paper Bucci and Segre (2011) have 
already analyzed the predictions of a model in which the process of human capital accumulation takes place as in Uzawa (1965) 
and Lucas (1988), and where the ratio /A H  remains invariant over time along the BGP (as in the present contribution). Unlike 
the present paper, however, in Bucci and Segre (2011) economic growth is driven by human capital accumulation, and not 
cultural capital investment. 
9 With 0η = , Ω  would equal 1 (for each tA  and tH  different from zero). In this case we would lose the average cultural 
capital effect in the economy. At a later stage, constraints on the (relationship between) feasible values of some exogenous 
parameters of the model (including η ) will be imposed, in order to guarantee that the model’s endogenous variables are strictly 
positive (see Proposition 1). 
10 More formally, we see that 1ηη −
∂Ω
= Δ
∂Δ
. Therefore, with tA  and tH  both positive at each 0t ≥ : (1) An increase in 
/t tA HΔ ≡  increases total factor productivity (Ω ) when 0η > . In this case the externality (that is the effect on aggregate TFP) 
taking place from a rise of the average cultural capital would be positive (it is an increase in A , relative to H , that increases 
Ω ); (2) A rise of /t tA HΔ ≡  decreases total factor productivity (Ω ) when 0η < . In this case, instead, the externality (the effect 
on aggregate TFP) coming from a rise of the average cultural capital in the economy would be negative (it is an increase in H , 
relative to A , that increases TFP). All in all, imposing 0η ≠  amounts to recognizing that we do not know a priori whether it is 
an increase in A  relative to H , or instead an increase in H  relative to A , that in the end contributes to increase TFP. 
Accordingly, we prefer to leave our analysis as much general as possible, and set 0η ≠ . With 0η ≠ , what (1) and (1’) together 
suggest is that Total Factor Productivity (Ω ) is somehow influenced by the ratio of the two types of capital stocks (cultural and 
human capital). 
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At this stage two remarks are in order. The first is that in our model cultural and human capital 
do play an important role in GDP-formation (i.e., the production of total output, Y ) both directly 
(since they represent two types of capital that enter the aggregate production function as factor-
inputs), and indirectly (since they are also able to influence total factor productivity). 
By combining (1) and (1’), and using the definition of Δ , the aggregate technology for goods 
production can be finally recast as: 
 
1
t tY Aα η−= Δ
,    ( )0;1α∈ ,    0η ≠ .                (1”) 
Thus, according to Eq. (1”), the second remark concerns the fact that we are analyzing the 
predictions of a generalized “AK”-type (one-sector) endogenous growth model in which physical 
capital is replaced by cultural capital. So, it is capable of generating positive and endogenous 
growth in the long-run. After describing the production side of the economy, we can now analyze 
the consumers’ behavior. 
 
 
 4.1 CONSUMERS 
 There is a continuum (of total mass equal to one) of identical households. Thus, we can 
focus on a representative infinitely-lived dynasty with perfect foresight, whose size coincides 
with the size of the entire population. However, since population size has been normalized to 
one, we are assuming that in this economy there exists only one agent who lives forever. This 
agent uses all the income s/he does not consume for investment in cultural capital. Therefore, the 
aggregate budget constraint reads as: 
      t t t A tA Y C Aδ
•
= − − ,    0 1Aδ≤ < ,    ( )0 0A > ,        (2) 
where A
•
 is (net) investment in cultural capital, C  denotes (aggregate/per-capita) consumption 
and Aδ  is the constant, instantaneous depreciation rate of cultural capital.11 The above equation 
says that savings ( )Y C−  are used to accumulate (gross) cultural capital, AA Aδ
•
+ .  
In what follows we analyze the choices of a benevolent social planner who seeks to maximize 
intertemporally the discounted instantaneous utility attained from the consumption of the 
                                                
11 It is well known that cultural heritage and artistic works need continuous conservation and maintenance expenditures. These 
are captured by Aδ , which may also be equal to zero in the model without changing the main results. 
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homogeneous final good by an infinitely-lived representative worker/consumer. The problem of 
the social planner is: 
{ }
( )
0,
0
  
t
t t t
t
t
C A
Max U u C e dtρ
=+∞
=
+∞
−≡ ∫ , ( )
1 1
1
t
t
Cu C
θ
θ
− −
=
−
,   0ρ > ;   1θ >     (3) 
s.t.: 
t
t t t A t t t A t
Y
A Y C A A C Aη αδ δ
•
−
≡
= − − = Δ − −1 2 3 ,     0 1Aδ≤ <  
 ( )0 0A > . 
 
In solving this problem, the social planner internalizes the external effect of a change in the 
average cultural capital in the economy on TFP.12  
Symbols used above have the following meaning: U  and ( )u C  are, respectively, the agent’s 
intertemporal utility function and her/his instantaneous isoelastic utility function. We denote by 
ρ  the pure rate of time-preference and by θ/1  the constant intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution in consumption. While the hypothesis 0ρ >  ensures that U is bounded away from 
infinity if C  remains constant over time, we have convincing evidence that 1>θ .13 We are now 
able to move to a formal characterization of the BGP equilibrium of this model. 
 
 
 4.2 BGP EQUILIBRIUM 
According to what briefly discussed in Section 2, the positive effects of creativity on the 
development of the economic system are expected to be greater and deeper when the cultural 
dimension plays a relevant role. In order to give a coherent theoretical representation of this idea 
following the model just depicted, we introduce a formal definition of BGP equilibrium. 
 
DEFINITION: Balanced Growth Path (BGP) Equilibrium 
 A BGP equilibrium in this economy is a long-run equilibrium where all variables depending on 
time grow at constant exponential (possibly positive) rates. 
 
                                                
12 In other words, since A  is a state-variable, the social planner sets explicitly /t tA HΔ ≡  when taking the (necessary) first 
order conditions of the problem stated in Eq. (3). 
13 See the short but comprehensive survey on the empirical estimates of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in 
consumption contained in Okubo (2011). In particular, using Japanese aggregate data, the author shows that the point-estimate of 
1/θ  for Japan is around 0.2 - 0.4, a value not significantly different from the one that can be found for the US. This implies that 
θ  is clearly larger than one (as already maintained by Hall, 1988). 
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It is possible to show that the following results do hold along the BGP equilibrium of this 
model economy.14 Eq. (4) gives the common BGP-equilibrium growth rate of the economy’s 
income (Y ), stock of cultural capital ( A ), stock of human capital (H ), and consumption (C ). 
Eq. (5), provides the BGP level of aggregate/per capita real income, Y , as a (linear) function of 
the stock of cultural capital. Finally Eq. (6) represents the optimal cultural to human capital ratio 
along the BGP equilibrium.  
 
      ( ) ( )11 1Y A H C A
η α α η
γ γ γ γ γ η α α η δ ρ
θ
+ − −⎡ ⎤= = = ≡ = + − − − −⎣ ⎦
       (4) 
          ( ) ( )1t tY A
η α α η
η α α η
− −
= + − −              (5) 
            1t
t
A
H
η α
α η
⎛ ⎞+ −
Δ ≡ = ⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
.             (6) 
 
Note that η , measuring the sign and the magnitude of the impact of a change in the average 
cultural capital on TFP, directly affects not only the level (Y ) and the growth rate (γ ) of GDP, 
but also the ratio Δ  itself. These results are obtained under the specific assumption that the ratio 
of cultural to human capital ( /t tA HΔ ≡ ) is constant, implying that 
t t
A H
t t
A H
A H
γ γ≡ = ≡
g g
. 
To ensure that the three main endogenous variables of the model take economically 
meaningful values (i.e. positive values) along the BGP, we introduce Proposition 1, which is then 
merely a technical proposition. 
 
PROPOSITION 1 
Assume 0tA >  and 0tH >  at each time 0t ≥ . With 1θ > , the following restrictions on the 
model’s parameter values: 
           ( ) ( )11 A
η α α η
η α α η δ ρ
+ − −
+ − − − >           (7) 
 
              ( )0 1α η< − < ,              (8) 
 
ensure that along the BGP: 0γ > ; 0Δ >  and 0tY > . 
 
Proof: Follows immediately from Eqs. (4)-(6). It is possible to notice that along the BGP 
equilibrium the social planner observes: ( ) ( ) ( )11 1tAt
t
Yp
A
η α α ηη αη α η α α η
+ − −−∂≡ = + − Δ = + − −
∂
, 
                                                
14 Mathematical derivation of these results is available in an appendix that can be obtained from the authors upon request. 
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where Ap  is the rental price paid by competitive firms for the use of cultural capital, A .15 
Therefore, Eq. (7) above requires the net rental price of cultural capital ( At Ap δ− ) to be larger 
than the pure time preference rate ( ρ ), a positive constant. In the Appendix (obtainable from the 
authors upon request), we also show that for the transversality condition to be checked it is 
sufficient that the net rental price of cultural capital is positive. Therefore, if the inequality 
written in (7) is satisfied, the transversality condition is also simultaneously satisfied.16  g 
 
The next two propositions (along with the corresponding lemmas) summarize the main results 
of the paper concerning, respectively, the effect of a change in the GDP share of cultural capital 
on optimal growth ( γ ) and on the level of per-capita/aggregate real income (Y ). 
 
PROPOSITION 2:  THE EFFECT OF A CHANGE IN THE GDP SHARE OF CULTURAL CAPITAL ON 
OPTIMAL ECONOMIC GROWTH, γ  
 
Define by ( )1s α≡ −  the share of cultural capital in GDP. Along the BGP equilibrium, with 1θ >  
and ( )0 1α η< − < : 
 
§  An increase in s  leads to a rise of the optimal growth rate γ  if 1Δ > ; 
§  An increase in s  leaves the optimal growth rate γ  unaffected if 1Δ = ; 
§  An increase in s  leads to a fall of the optimal growth rate γ  if 1Δ < . 
 
Proof: Using Eq. (4), we have: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
11 1 ln
s
α η α ηγ
α η α η
θ
− − −
≡Ζ
∂
= ⎡ − − ⎤ − Δ⎣ ⎦∂ 1 4 4 4 4 4 2 4 4 4 4 4 3 ,      1 0ttAH α ηα η⎛ ⎞− +Δ ≡ = >⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠ . 
 
With 1θ >  and ( )0 1α η< − < , Ζ  is certainly positive. Therefore, the sign of the derivative 
crucially depends on whether 1Δ ¶ .  g 
 
                                                
15 More precisely, defining by Ap  and Hp  the rental prices paid by competitive firms producing the homogeneous good Y  for 
the use of the two types of capital (cultural capital, A , and human capital, H , respectively), the profit of a generic, atomistic, 
competitive firm producing final output (Y ) is: Y Y A H A HPY p A p H Y p A p Hπ = − − = − − , where 1YP ≡ . Profit maximization 
implies that the marginal product of each input equals its own rental price, i.e. A
Y p
A
∂
=
∂
 and H
Y p
H
∂
=
∂
. These rental prices go to 
the owners of each type of capital. 
16 If η  were equal to zero, inequality (8) would be trivially checked since ( )0;1α ∈ . We rule out this case from our analysis. 
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Proposition 2 reveals two important results. The first is that the effect of the cultural capital 
share in GDP on the rate of (optimal) economic growth is highly non-monotonic and crucially 
depends on the relative size of Δ , the ratio of cultural to human capital.   
The second suggests that increasing the share of cultural capital in GDP would yield in the 
long-run a rise of the optimal growth rate only in those countries where the existing stock of 
cultural capital (relative to the stock of human capital) is sufficiently large, that is 1Δ > . 
 
LEMMA 1: WHEN THE SHARE OF CULTURAL CAPITAL IN GDP GIVES MAJOR EFFECTS ON ECONOMIC 
GROWTH 
 
Along the BGP equilibrium: 
 
§ An increase in s  leads to a rise of the optimal growth rate γ  if ( ) 10
2
α η< − < ; 
§ An increase in s  leaves the optimal growth rate γ  unaffected if ( ) 1
2
α η− = ; 
§  An increase in s  leads to a fall of the optimal growth rate γ  if ( )1 1
2
α η< − < . 
 
Proof: Immediate from Proposition 2, the definition of 1 α η
α η
⎛ ⎞− +
Δ = ⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
, and the fact that 
( )0 1α η< − <  (Eq. 8).  g 
 
 According to Lemma 1, for given α , the bigger η  (hence, the smaller α η− ), the more 
positive the impact of a further increase in s  on the optimal growth rate of the economy. In 
words this means that, for given share of human capital in GDP, in economies where the 
externality-effect induced at the aggregate TFP level by an expansion of the average cultural 
capital is more sizeable, it should be more rewarding (in terms of optimal growth) to increase the 
share of cultural capital in GDP. 
 
PROPOSITION 3:  THE EFFECT OF A CHANGE IN THE GDP SHARE OF CULTURAL CAPITAL ON THE 
LEVEL OF INCOME  
 
Define by ( )1s α≡ −  the share of cultural capital in GDP. Along the BGP equilibrium, with 
0tA >  and ( )0 1α η< − < : 
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§  An increase in s  leads to a rise of the level of income tY  if ( )ln 1Δ Δ > Δ + ; 
§  An increase in s  leaves the level of income tY  unaffected if ( )ln 1Δ Δ = Δ + ; 
§  An increase in s  leads to a fall of the level of income tY  if ( )ln 1Δ Δ < Δ + . 
 
Proof: Using Eq. (5), it is possible to compute: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
11 lnt t
Y A
s
α η α η
α η α η
α η
− − −
≡Ψ
⎡ ⎤∂
= ⎡ − − ⎤ − Δ −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∂ Δ −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦1 4 4 4 44 2 4 4 4 4 43 ,      1 0ttAH α ηα η⎛ ⎞− +Δ ≡ = >⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠ . 
 
Since ( )0 1α η< − < , Ψ  is certainly positive. With 0tA > , the sign of the derivative crucially 
depends on the sign of 
( )
1ln
α η
⎡ ⎤
Δ −⎢ ⎥
Δ −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
.  Manipulation of this expression, in conjunction with 
the fact that 1 1
α η
⎛ ⎞
= Δ +⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
, delivers the results stated in the Proposition.  g 
 
 In order to have an intuition of Proposition 3, Figure 2 plots both 1Δ + – the linear function – 
and ( )lnΔ Δ  – the non linear function – in terms of Δ . 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6
2
4
6
8
10
12
 
FIGURE 2. The plot of ( )lnΔ Δ  and 1Δ +  as functions of /t tA HΔ ≡ . 
 
Hence, we observe that: 
 
§ 0tY
s
∂
>
∂
   3.591122t
t
A  
H
∀ Δ ≡ > Δ ≅ ; 
§ 0tY
s
∂
=
∂
   for 3.591122t
t
A
H
Δ ≡ = Δ ≅ ; 
§ 0tY
s
∂
<
∂
   3.591122t
t
A  
H
∀ Δ ≡ < Δ ≅ . 
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In other words, in countries where cultural capital is largely more abundant than human 
capital we should observe in theory a positive impact of an increase in the share of cultural 
capital in GDP on the level of per capita real income. 
 
 Using the definition of 1 0t
t
A
H
α η
α η
⎛ ⎞− +
Δ ≡ = >⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
, we can state the following Lemma. 
 
LEMMA 2: WHEN THE SHARE OF CULTURAL CAPITAL IN GDP GIVES MAJOR EFFECTS ON THE LEVEL 
OF INCOME 
 
Along the BGP equilibrium: 
§ An increase in s  leads to a rise of the level of income tY  if ( )
10 0.22
4,591122
α η< − < ≅ ; 
§  An increase in s  leaves the level of income tY  unaffected if ( )
1 0.22
4,591122
α η− = ≅ ; 
§  An increase in s  leads to a fall of the level of income tY  if ( )
10.22 1
4.591122
α η≅ < − < . 
 
 This Lemma says that, for given share of human capital in GDP (α ), in countries where η  is 
bigger (i.e., the externality-effect induced at the aggregate TFP level by an expansion of the 
average cultural capital is more sizeable), it should be more likely to observe a positive impact 
of an increase in ( )1s α≡ −  on the level of real per capita income. Putting together Lemma 1 and 
Lemma 2 yields: 
 
LEMMA 3:  THE EFFECT OF A CHANGE IN η  ON THE RELATION AMONG THE GDP SHARE OF 
CULTURAL CAPITAL, THE OPTIMAL GROWTH, AND THE LEVEL OF INCOME 
 
Along the BGP equilibrium, for given α , the higher η  (therefore, the smaller α η− ), the more 
positive the simultaneous impact of an increase in ( )1s α≡ −  on the level and the optimal growth 
rate of real per capita income. 
 
 So, ceteris paribus, increasing the share of cultural capital in GDP would lead in the long-run 
to a better pay-off (higher level and growth rate of per capita income) in those countries in which 
average cultural capital plays significant externality-effects in terms of aggregate TFP. 
 
 
5. Discussion and conclusions 
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Our theoretical model suggests that, in order to have a culture-driven endogenous growth 
model, the underlying economy must be a culture-intensive one: If 1Δ > , i.e. if the stock of 
cultural capital exceeds that of human capital, then, as shown in Proposition 2, a rise of the share 
of cultural capital in GDP increases the optimal growth rate, whereas, in a human capital-
intensive economy ( 1Δ < ), it has the reverse effect. In other words, culture becomes a real engine 
of growth only when its presence in the economy is pervasive enough. Likewise, Proposition 3 
states that an increase in the share of cultural capital in GDP has a positive effect on per capita 
income only in a highly culture-intensive economy (as shown in the numerical example, the 
value of Δ that would allow to reach this result may well be largely over unity – in the example, 
for instance, it lies between 3 and 4). 
Together, Propositions 2 and 3 allow us concluding that, for an increase in the GDP share of 
cultural capital to have simultaneously a positive effect on the optimal growth rate and the level 
of per capita income, an economy’s ratio of cultural to human capital ( /A HΔ ≡ ) should be 
sufficiently large. This result seems to point to (and, therefore, might be explained by) the 
existence of important “critical mass”, or “network”, or else threshold-effects in the long run 
relationship between GDP growth/level and the share of cultural capital in aggregate income.  In 
this respect, one testable prediction of our analysis would be that a rise of the cultural capital 
share in GDP can yield a positive impact on economic growth/level of per-capita and aggregate 
income solely beyond a certain threshold of this share.  
Ceteris paribus, it is also worth remarking the economic role of the parameter η : in an 
economy in which cultural capital intensity truly has a strong and positive bearing (external 
positive effect) on aggregate TFP, we expect that investing in culture becomes an effective 
engine of growth.    
The results of the model seem to suggest an explanation as to why certain industrialized 
economies are more willing to invest in cultural capital than others. It is only when, due to past 
circumstances, a large level of cultural capital has been accumulated, that culture is able to 
display its positive effects on the economy’s growth and income potential. On the contrary, when 
the existing cultural stock is poor, culture is actually jeopardizing the economy’s performance. In 
industrialized countries focusing their economic development on traditional industrial assets and 
considering culture only as marginal “luxury goods” or “merit goods”, economic growth can be 
at risk. This being the case, we can figure out the possibility of a cultural poverty trap as the 
cause of poor growth performance of some economies in the current post-industrial scenario 
where production processes increasingly depend on cultural inputs. Culturally poor economies, 
according to our model, tend to grow slowly because their total factor productivity is too small, 
and the cause of this poor total factor productivity is that lack of cultural exposure makes the 
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available human capital, all other conditions being equal, too ‘dumb’, i.e., weakly inclined to be 
used in innovative, flexible ways. 
When applied to developing countries, another explanation of the results of our model arises. 
If there are options of substitution with other production factors, until a certain threshold the 
profitability of the substitution would lead to concentrate the investment on other factors more 
productive than culture. For developing countries, the existence of basic endowments and 
infrastructures, such as roads, hospitals and schools, are necessary conditions for economic 
growth. Before this necessary conditions are meet, economic growth can not be driven by 
cultural investment, that are competing with other fundamental public expenditures.    
The model also suggests that the divide between culturally intensive and culturally poor 
economies could widen up through time, as the result of different growth performances, and that, 
on the contrary, a sudden accumulation of cultural capital due to external factors – e.g. a non 
market mediated accumulation due to the concurrence of exceptional historical and 
environmental factors, such as an exceptional episode of ‘cultural renaissance’ due to an high 
concentration of innate creative talent and/or to the sudden availability of a large inherited stock 
of cultural assets, as it happened for instance in the Italian Renaissance with the re-discovery of 
the Greek-Roman classics made possible by the patient work of preservation and copying carried 
out by the Medieval monks – could be conducive to sudden, explosive growth. 
These findings are, of course, open to empirical scrutiny, and we look forward to further 
research – up to now totally missing – aimed at testing the model on suitable time series data.17 
In particular, it will be interesting to check not only the economy’s growth performance as 
depending on the available (relative) stock of cultural capital, but also its effect on total factor 
productivity. So far, the notion of total factor productivity has kept a singular status in the 
literature – that of a ‘residual’ concept, namely, a magnitude that, rather than reflecting some 
specific and well-understood force, stood for all those productivity effects that were not traceable 
back to any specific traditional production factor and should have therefore been capturing some 
joint effects of all of the factors at work. What our model suggests is that such a ‘mysterious’ 
effect could indeed capture the role of culture as a differential factor that allows a smarter, more 
open-minded and creative use of the available factors and resources – an intuition that seems to 
be confirmed from the preliminary evidence that indeed cultural access seems to be correlated so 
many diverse aspects of human life (Howkins, 2001; Grossi et al., 2011). 
                                                
17 See Bucci and Segre (2011) for a discussion about the few and insufficient actual possible measures of cultural 
capital. 
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We are aware that a substantial amount of further research is needed to check whether these 
conclusions are granted. But it is interesting to point out that, should this be the case, it would be 
needed to rethink cultural policy as a key entry of the overall policy menu, rather than as a minor, 
sectorial policy as it is often commonly meant now. And this would mean in turn that the 
economy has found an engine of growth that not only does not bring about any sort of adverse 
environmental effect, but one that generally has a strongly positive effect on individual well-
being, social cohesion, and human development. For once, we could think of growth as a win-
win game. We look forward to this exciting prospect.    
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